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[L. A. No. 20739. In Bank. Feb. 10. 1950.] 
RAYMOND L. HEFFERAN, Respondent, v. J. RAY 
FREEBAIRN, Appellant. 
[L. A. Nc. 20740 In Bank. Feb. 10, 1950.] 
J. RAY FREEBAIRN, Appellant, v. RAYMOND L. 
HEFFERAN. Respondent. 
[1] gales-Rescissio~ by Buyer-Fraud.-In a buyer's action to 
rescind a contract for the sale of a restaurant on the groune. 
of fraud. negligence on the part of plaintiff in failing to dis-
cover the falsity of a statement by defendant is no defeDbol 
when the misrepresentation was intentional rather than negli-
gent. 
[2] Id.-Fraud-Reliance on B,epresentatioDB.-A buyer of a res-
taurant business who possesses no special knowledge of the 
[1] See 22 Cal.Jr.r. 912; 46 Am.Jur. 902. 
McK Dig. References! [1] SRles, § 176(6); [2-4] Sales. § 154; 
[5] Sales, § 188; [6] Sales, § 150; [7] Sales, §59; [8] Sales, § 186; 
[9) Sales, § 185. 
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business is not, in guarding himself against false representa.1 
tions of the seller, held to the standard of precaution or ~ 
minimum knowledge of a hypothetical, reasonable man. ,i 
[3J Id.-Fraud-ltelianee on ~epresentations.-A buyer of a rea:. 
taurant business is not required to employ experts to investi-
gate matters of a technical nature, such as earnings of the, 
business, as to which the ,-eller has full knowledge and the, 
buyer none, and if for this reason the investigation is incom- i 
plete he may show that he relied on the representations as to: 
the matters which he did not investigate. J 
[4j Id.-Fraud-ltelianee on ltepresentations.-A buyer of a rea- \ 
taurant business may be justified in accepting the seller's refer-. ; 
ence to rebates as an explanation of the low profit shown .. n I 
the accounting ttatements, especially as he is D'lt chargeable 1 
with knowledge of conditions that he fails to discovt:r because : 
of some artifice or deception of the &eller. ; 
[6] Id.-J.teacisslon b)' B1I7er-Aetions-Appeal.-In a buyer's ao- ' 
tion to rescind a contract for sale· of .!l restaurant, a finding 
that plaintif! relied on misrepresentations by defendant as to 
earnings of the business and was thereby induced to purchase 
the restaurant was conclusive on appeal, where there was sub-
st&.ntial evidence offered ~y the parties to support the con1l.ict-
ing versions of the facts and it could not be said that the trial 
court was compelled by the evidence to find for defendant. . 
(6] 1d.-Fraud-Damage.-A buyer of a restaurant business suf-
fered a substantial injury as a result of the seller's fraud where 
he received a business earning less than $10,000 a year which 
the seller had represeuted as earning $20,000. 
[7] 1d.-lteseission by Buyer-Actions-Pleading and Proof.-In a 
buyer's action to rescind a contract for the sale of a restaurant, 
plaintiff need not plead or prove pecuniary loss as a result of 
defendant's fraud, it being sufficient to show that injury or 
prejudIce has resulted from the fraud. 
[8] 1d. - J.tescissioll. b)' Bu),er - Actions--Questions of Law and 
Fact.-In a buyer's action to rescind a contract for the sale of 
a restaurant, the question of waiver of the right to rescind 
was one of fact to be decided after a consideration of all the 
eircDmstances of the ease, and the mere fact that plaintiff, 
after 1I.ling notice of rescission, filed a certificate of business 
under fictitious name in compliance with Civ.' Code, § 2466, 
and made payments on a note secured by chattel mortgage, 
did not require the trW court to make a finding of waiver 
as a matter of law. 
[9] Id.-J.tescission b)' B1I7er-Actions-Evidence.-In a buyer's 
action to rescind a contract for the sale of a restaurant, the 
evidence supporte': a finding that paYLlents made by plai'ltiff 
OIl a note for the unpaid balance, after giving DOtice of re-
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acission, were for the purpose of preventing a default aD the 
nott and a chattel mortgage securing it, and were not intended 
.. 8 waiver of his rights under the notice of rescission. 
APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Ellsworth Meyer, Judge pro tem.- Affirmed. 
Action by buyer to rescind a contract for sale of a restau-
rant, to cancel a note and chattel mortgage, and to obtain 
restitution of cash payment; and action by seller to foreclose 
the mortgage. Judgments for plaintiff in first action and for 
defendant in second action, affirmed. 
W. I. Gilbert, Jr., and Henry E. Kappler for Appellant. 
Edward L. Barrett, Jr., as Amicus Curiae on behalf of 
Appellant. 
Boller, Suttner & Boller and T. R. Suttner for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-On or about December 20,1946, plaintiff, 
R. L. H~fferan, entered into a contract to purchase the "Gilray 
Coffee Shop" from defendant J. R. Freebairn. He paid 
$20,000 in cash and $35,000 in the form of a promissory note 
secured by a chattel mortgage. Plaintiff took possession 
of the coffee shop on January 1, 1947. the escrow was closed 
on January 7. 1947. Plaintiff gave defendant a check for the 
inventory about January 27. 1947. On January 28, 1947, 
he served notice of rescission. A certificate of Business Under 
a Fictitious Name was filed by plaintiff on January 29, 
1947, and thereafter he continued to operate the caf~. On 
February 1, 1947, and March 1, 1947, he made two payments 
of $1,000 each on the promissory note. Defendant did not 
accept the offer of rescission. On March 17, 1947. plaintiff 
filed this action to rescind the contract, to cancel the note 
and mortgage, and to obtain restitution of his cash payment. 
Defendant subsequently brought an action to foreclose the 
chattel mortgage, and the two actions were consoJidatNl. 
Judgments were entered for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. 
As grounds for rescission, plaintiff alleged that defend-
ant stated that the Gilray Coffee Shop would net over $20.000 
profit for 1946 and madt' other misreprellentations. Plaintiff 
further allegeo that all tht' reprt'srntations were false lind 
• Anirned by Chairman of J udicilll Couucil. 
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fraudulent and that he relied upon them and was thereb 
induced to enter into the agreement. The evidence on th 
matters is contradictory. 
Plaintiit testified in full support of the allegations. D 
fendant denied ever having made the statements in question 
Both agreed that they visited defendant's accountant 0 
December 19, 1946, for the purpose of inspecting the recor 
of the coffee shop. They agreed that the inspection was limite 
to the profit and loss statements for the first 10 months 0 
1946 and gross sales records for November and part of n • 
. cember, 1946. Plaintiff testi:6ed that both defendant and hisl 
accountant assured him that the profits made by the business 
were really higher than those shown on the statements, but 
both defendant and the accountant denied giving any such 
assurance. Plaintiff further testified that the profit and 
loss statements showed a profit of about $8,000 instead of 
$16,000, but that when he asked defendant to explain the ms;. 
crepancy, defendant told him that there were rebates from 
suppliers not shown on the statements. Defendant admitted 
discussing rebates but testified that they were reflected in 
the books of the coffee shop. Plaintiff testified that the 
payments made on the note after giving notice of rescission i were made with the intention of protecting himself from 
default on the chattel mortgage. 
The trial court resolved all issues of credibility and made 
all inferences from the testimony in favor of plaintiff. It 
was found that to induce plaintiff to purcbase the cafe de-
fendant made, among others, the following misrepresenta-
tions: that the business would earn $20,000 for the year 1946 
and that defendant had already taken $16,000 out of the 
business up to and including October, 1946 The court fur- . 
ther found that plaintiff relied on the representations and 
would not have purchased the cafe had be not believed 
them to be true; that the representations were untrue; that 
the cafe earned only $5,666.25 during the first 11 months 
of 1946, $387.19 during December, and that defendant had 
taken only $10,115 out of the business up to and including 
October. 1946: that plaintiff discovered the falsity of the 
representations after taking possession of the business; that 
in the course of an inspection of defendant's records, plain-
tiff saw only profit and loss statements for the first 10 months 
of 1946 and gross sales records for November and part of 
De('ember, 1946; that these records indicated a profit of only 
$5,666.25; that before any agreement by the parties, defendant 
) 
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had represented that the profits were much larger than those 
shown on the statements, inasmuch as profits were earned 
from trade rebates that were not accounted for in the state-
ments. The trial judge further found that the two pay-
ments of $1,000 on account of the purchase price after giving 
notice of rescission were made for the purpose of preventing 
a default on the note and mortgage pending negotiations 
concerning plaintiff's notice of rescission and were not in· 
tended by him as a waiver of his rights under the notice. 
Three issues of law are pr('sented to this court. (1) Was 
the plaintiff justified in relying on the niisrepresentatioDll' 
(2) did the plaintiff prove sufficient injury resulting from 
defendant's fraud to justify rescission' (3) Did the plain-
tiff waive the right to rescind by the payments on the note 
or by other actions' 
I 
Defendant contends that plaintiff is precluded from rescind-
ing the contract by virtue of the knowledge that he acquired 
or should have acquired in the course of the negotiations 
with defendant. 
[1,2] The standards by which the buyer's acts must be 
judged were set forth by this court in 8eeger v. Odell. 18 
Ca1.2d 409 [115 P.2d 977. 136 A.L.R 1291]. "Negligence on 
the part of the plaintiff in failing to discover the falsity of 
a statement is no defense when the misrepresentation was 
intentional rather than negligent .... Nor is a plaintift' 
held to the standard of precaution or of minimum knowledge 
of a hypothetical, reasonable man. Exceptionally gullible or ig-
norant people have been permitted to recover from defendants 
who took advantage of them in circumstances where persons of 
normal intelligence would not have been misled. [Authorities 
cited.} 'No rogue should enjoy his ill-gotten plunder for the 
simple reason that his victim is by chance a fool.' . . . If the 
conduct of the plaintiff in the light of his own intelligence and 
information was manifestly unreasonable, however, he will 
be denied a recovery." (8eeger v. Odell, 18 Ca1.2d 409, 
414415 [115 P.2d 977, 136 A.L.R. 1291].) The necessary 
implication of the findings and judgment below is that 
plaintiff's reliance was justified. Finding IV states : "The 
plaintiff believed and relied upon each and all of the fore-
going representations made by defendant and was thereby 
induced to purchase said Cafe. Plaintiff would not hav(' 
purchased said Cafe had he not believed that each of said 
I 
I 
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representations was true. At said time plaintiff had never' 
been in the restaurant business, and possessed no special. 
knowledge or information concerning restaurant fixtures~' 
aIlll the restaurant business except some experience gained 
in the army." In Finding XVII the court states: ., It is true ~ 
that plaintiff inspected certain records of defendant per-; 
taining to the profit and loss of said business but in this ' 
connection the Court finds that plaintiff was shown only . 
profit and loss statements for the first 10 months of 1946" 
and gross sales records for November and part of December,' 
1946.°' Finally, the court found that after plaintiff saw: 
the statements indicating a smaller profit than had been; 
represented, defendant explained the discrepancy by the, 
fact that trade rebates were not shown in the statements. ~ 
The defendant relies on Carpenter v. Hamilton, 18 Cal.·~ 
App.2d 69 {62 P.2d 1397], where the court said (p. 71) •. ~ 
"If it fairly appears from the evidence that the buyer under- ~ 
took to investigate for himself the matters as to which rep- :~ 
resentations had been made, he cannot be allowed to later 'l. 
claim that he acted upon the representations, even though .( 
he voluntarily abandoned bis investigation before it was 
completed." In the Carpenter case, however, the defects in 
the property conveyed were immediately visible upon the 
most cursory inspection by one taking possession of the realty. ~ .. 1 
[3] The misrepresentations of earnings in the present case I 
fall into a category for which the Carpenter case makes 1 
a specific exception, i.e., "that a buyer is not required to ;. 
employ experts to investigate matters of a technical nature 1 
as to which the seller has full knowledge and the buyer 
none, and if for this reason the investigation is incomplete i 
he may show that he relied upon the representations as to 
matters which he did not investigate." (Ct. Shearer v. Cooper, 
2] Cal.2d 695, 703, 704 [134 P.2d 764J j Bagdasarian v. Grag-
nun, 31 Ca1.2d 744, 748 [192 P.2d 935}.} [4] In the ligbt of' 
the court's finding that plaintiff accepted defendant's refer- . 
ence to rebates as an explanation of the low profit shown on 
the accounting statements, another exception specified in the 
Carpenter case applies, namely, that a buyer is not chargeable 
with knowledge of conditions that be fails to discover because 
of some artifice or deception of the seller. 
More closely analogous on its facts to the present case 
is Davis v. Butler, 154 Cal. 623 {98 P. 1047], involving a 
sale of a controlling interest in a bottling company, which 
was rescinded becaUlie the !Seller of the stock had misrepre-
Feb. 1950] nEFFEBAN tI. FREEBAIRN 
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&ented the amount of the corporation's indebtedness. The 
court said: "The rule that a party may not complain of mis-
representations regarding matters which he has investigated 
or, having the opportunity so to do, has begun to investigate 
for himself .. has no application here. While the plain-
tiff, before purchasing, looked over the books of the corpora-
tion, the court finds (and the finding is not challenged) that 
defendant stated to plaintiff that neither he nor ·the corpor-
ation kept any books of account showing the corporate in-
debtedness. The plaintiff was fully justified in relying upon 
defendant's statements as to such indebtedness." (154 Cal. 
623, 627.) [5] There was substantial evidence offered by 
the parties in the present case to support the con1licting 
versions of the facts. We cannot say that the trial court was 
compelled by the evidence to find for the defendant and we 
must therefore accept its finding. 
Since there was one material misrepresentation justifiably 
relied on by the plaintiff, thert: is no necessity for a discussion 
of the other misrepresentations made by the defendant. (See 
12 Cal.Jur. 741.) 
II 
[6] The second major issue in this ease is: Did the 
plaintiff prove that suflicient injury resulted from defendant'. 
fraud to justify rescission t In DatJis v. Butler. 154 Cal. 
623, 627 [98 P. 1047], the court stated: "It is not essential 
to the right to rescind a contract for the purchase of property 
that the purchaser should be able to show that the property 
purchased was worth less than he paid for it. It is enough 
that he was induced, by false representations, to buy prop-
erty which would, if the representations had been true, have 
been worth more than it actually was worth. Spr6ck6la v. 
CorNU, 152 Cal. 383 [92 P, 1011]." It is 'obvious that re-
ceiving a business earning less than $10,000 a year constitutes 
a substantial injury to a buyer to whom it was represented 
as earning $20,000. [7] The plaintiff' need not plead or 
prove pecuniary loss, 80 long as the record indicates that 
there was an injury or prejudice resulting from the fraud. 
Dunn v. Stringer, 41 Cal.App.2d 638 [107 P.2d 411]. The 
case of Darrow v. H01tlikan, 205 Cal. 771 [272 P. 1049] does 
not militate against this conclusion. There, the defendants 
believed themselves defrauded because they learned that 
the land they had contracted to acquire in an exchange was 
encumbered by a trust deed different in its term from the 
) 
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mortgage that the plaintiff real estate broker had rel:>reSCtlttlll 
was on the realty. The defendants refused to perform 
the plaintiff sued for and recovered his commission. 
court held that the defendants had shown no injury. " 
not shown, nor have the defendants attempted to show. 
had the sixty-day period allowed to the Littles (vcAAU"":'JIII 
by the exchange agreement to comply with its 
been permitted to elapse the defendants would not have· 
ceived that for which they had bargained and upon 
exact terms and conditions specified.. . It cannot now 
said that the Littles' property would not have come to . 
defendants within or at the expiration of the period 
in the agreement, subject to a mortgage encumbrance in 
sum of $2,000. The plaintiff. if he had not been precl 
by defendants' abandonment of thE' transaction. might 
made, with the assistance of the Littles. all necessary 
ments prior to the expiration of thE' period fixE'd by the 
change agreement." (205 Cal. 771. 775.) I n the present 
the sale was consummated, and plaintiff did in fact .. ",." ... ,. 
less than what had been representE'd to him he would rec:en'e.l 
III 
[8] The third issue raised by the facts is: Did plaintiff waive ' .. 
his right to rescind by making two payments on the note after 
giving notice of rescission, or by his other action or inaction in 
the ease t The defense of waiver raises an issue of fact to be 
decided after a consideration of all the circumstances of ,: 
the particular case, and is a question primarily for the trial . 
court. (French v. Freeman, 191 Cal. 579 f217 P. 515] ; Sch;ed . 
v. Bodimon Mfg. 00., 79 Cal.App.2d 1~4 [179 P.2d 3801.) I 
Did plaintiff delay an unreasonable length of time beforek 
giving notice of rescission' In French v. Freeman. supra, ) 
the court held that the lapse of four months beforE' rE'scission: 
after discovery of the first misrepresentation din not. as a) 
matter of law, constitute a waiver of frands discovE'red 
subsequently. The critical misrepresE'ntation in thE' prt'8-
ent casc was that of profits higher than thosc actually ellrnf'd 
by the coffee shop. Plaintiff had control of thE' restaurant 
from January 1. 1947; he gave notice of rescission on January 
28, 1947. Since the profits were calculated on a monthly 
basis and the rebates paid monthly. the interval of 28 days 
from the assumption of control to thf' attempt po rf'scission 
would permit an inference of scrupulous promptness as easily 
as one of undue delay. 
) 
) 
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Since plaintiff had not waived his rights up to the notice 
of rescission on January 28, 1947, waiver can only be predi-
cated on his acts after giving notice. Filing a Certificate 
of Business Under Fictitious Name in compliance with Civil 
Code, section 2466, cannot be said to require the trial court 
to make a finding of waiver as a matter of law. Simi-
larly, the payments on the note after giving notice merely 
constitute facts to be considered by the trial court in deter-
mining whether the plaintiff had ratified the transaction or 
waived the fraud. (Switzler v. Klein & Co., 94 Cal.App. 410 
[271 P. 367] ; Cameron v. Evans Securities Corp., 119 Cal.App. 
164 [6 P.2d 272] ; Munson v. Fishburn, 183 Cal. 206 [190 P. 
808] .) [9] The trial court made an express finding that 
the payments made by plaintiff were for the purpose of pre-
venting a default on the note and. mortgage, and were not 
intended as a waiver of his rights under the notice of rescission. 
There is substantial evidence to support this interpretation 
of plaintiff's acts and no evidence that defendant was misled 
or injured by any undue delay in giving notice of rescission .. 
(See Esau v. Briggs, 89 Cal.App.2d 427 [201 P.2d 25].) . 
The judgments are affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer, 
J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied March 6, 
1950. 
